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Six movements in search of a social basis 
Abstract 
 
The literature on contemporary social movements represents a political 
reductionism within which the ascription of instrumental rationality to these 
movements appears both as premise and as conclusion. Hence it is unable to offer 
an adequate theory of the 'social bases' of movement action, despite the key status of 
this issue for instrumentalist theories of movements. Reorientation is, however, 
blocked by the political reductionism of the literature, for which the everyday social 
reality of the movements themselves is only of interest insofar as they represent a 
convenient vehicle for accounts of 'rationality' (individual or societal). 
 
Six movements in search of a social basis 
Political reductionism and the circularity of 
'rationality'  
Political reductionism and the 'social movements' problematic 
Contemporary challenges to the dominant order such as the women's, green and 
peace movements are conventionally treated as the subjects of a 'social movements' 
literature [1] which, despite internal divisions, is now widely seen as convergent by 
both critics and supporters (Diani 1992, Jones 1993) [2]. I will argue that this 
convergence derives from a common problematic (Althusser 1969, pp.253-4, 257) 
which ultimately reduces 'social movements' to essentially political phenomena on 
the basis of a flawed conception of rationality. 
This effect can be found within both of the dominant approaches. Within the 
'American political science' perspective, an economistic focus on individual 
rationality, whether in the abstract as in 'resource mobilisation' approaches or in the 
context of a (national) 'political opportunity structure', is taken as the starting-point 
for the organisational analysis, or (as it is sometimes expressed) the 'how' of social 
movements. Here a particular version of rationality is explicitly taken as a 
methodological presupposition (see e.g. the critique in Cohen (1985, pp.674 - 
676)) [3]. Within the 'European social theory' perspective, what we are offered is 
effectively a discourse of rationality at a societal level, which explains the 'why' of 
social movements, either in abstract accounts of the structure of contemporary 
society, or in the contexts of differing forms of class analysis (cf. the critique in 
Bagguley (1992, pp.26 - 38)). Here, in a sense, the emphasis is on constructing a 
plausible account of the rationality taken to be embodied in social movements. 
The actual convergence of these two perspectives is then most evident in a shared 
assumption as to the existence of a rational link between the socially given 'interests' 
of the groups which make up the movements and the interaction of the movements 
with the polity. This, I will argue, ultimately translates into a series of variants of 
political reductionism, generated and held together by a limited concept of 
rationality. The net result of this is that, as Alan Scott (1990, p.131) declares, citing 
Gramsci, 'all the essential questions of sociology are nothing other than the 
questions of political science' - or at least they are made to appear as such. 
The problems with political reductionism 
The difficulties which derive from this approach have to do with the circularity of 
the arguments that follow from it, where an author's definition of rationality 
appears both as a premise of the argument and as a conclusion. Alan Scott's recent 
work Ideology and the new social movements (1990) is a useful example here: like 
other recent authors (Eder 1985, Bagguley 1992) he effectively replaces one 
political reductionism by another and thus demonstrates the difficulty of escaping 
from the 'social movements' paradigm as currently constructed. 
Thus his argument for an analysis of social movements in terms of social closure 
begins with the statement that 'Locating social movements in terms of social closure 
... assumes [my emphasis] that the central theme / aim of these movements is 
integration'. It closes with the discovery that 'In sum, an analysis of social 
movements in terms of social closure and interest intermediation treats the 
integration of issues and groups into the policy as the criterion of social movement 
success.' (Scott 1990, p.136, p.152). However, no argument in support of this has 
been produced; rather, a methodological assumption has been transformed into a 
substantive conclusion. 
Something similar happens in his institutional analysis: we are told in a 
programmatic way at the start that 'At the level of concrete political analysis new 
social movements ... can be viewed as a reaction to the failure of the institutions of 
interest intermediation: parliaments, the media and, especially, political parties.' At 
the end we find that 'It may be argued that social movements effect change largely 
through influencing existing institutions of political intermediation, particularly 
political parties.' (Scott 1990, pp.140, 152). In other words, a political reduction of 
the movements appears both as premise and as conclusion [4]. Scott's case is 
repeatedly presented in this way: as if an argument was to follow, or had already 
been presented, but without the argument itself. 
Apart from the circularity of the theory, Scott's work also presents a good example 
of the effects of political reductionism on empirical research. Firstly, what is initially 
presented as an 'examination of [the] main ideological strands of "the new social 
movements" ' is reduced, on the next page and without explanation, to an 
examination of 'ecological ideology' (Scott 1990, pp. 80 - 81). Secondly, this is taken 
as effectively represented by the then West German Green Party, with no discussion 
of the notoriously thorny issue of the relationship between the party and the 
different 'new social movements' (Raschke 1991, pp.114 - 144). Thirdly, there is a 
reduction of 'ideology' to the writings of professional ideologists, but without any 
examination of this highly problematic assumption (see, for example, Eagleton 
1991). Lastly, and most importantly, the issue of the representativity of these 
ideologists is left completely examined. 
In fact, of the six figures whose views we are offered, only one (Joschka Fischer) has 
any claim to representativity, being both a regional party boss and a faction leader. 
Of the other five, only Petra Kelly was still a party member in 1990, but her 
reputation abroad was paralleled by a near-total lack of influence within the 
German party, shown by her failure to be reselected, her lack of factional affiliation, 
and the isolation which led to her recent death not being discovered for several 
days. Of the others, one (Otto Schily) had joined the SPD by the time Scott was 
writing; Rudolf Bahro had left the party five (!) years earlier, virtually without 
support (Raschke 1991, p.26); to the best of my knowledge Carl Amery has no 
political affiliations (cf. Schäfer 1983, p.127); and Herbert Gruhl had been running 
splinter parties without electoral or other significance for almost a decade [5]. Thus, 
with the exception of Fischer, the actual ideologists and faction-leaders of the Green 
Party - people like Antje Vollmer, Jutta Ditfurth, Thomas Ebermann or Frieder-Otto 
Wolf - are ignored, as are the communication organs of the movement such as die 
tageszeitung, Kommune or any of the purely internal magazines [6]. 
Once again, the argument is circular: we are told that 'Despite its grass-roots 
democratic principles the European ecology movement has indeed thrown up, and 
often centred around, political celebrities such as Petra Kelly, Otto Schily and 
Joschka Fischer' (1990, p.117). In other words, it is assumed that things centre 
around leaders, and we are presented with the conclusion that anyone Scott has 
heard of must be one of these leaders. As with the relationship between the 
'movements' and the Green Party, the problem of the effectiveness or otherwise of 
'grass-roots democracy' rules in strengthening ordinary members as against a 
leadership ?=élite has been the subject of intense discussion among academics and 
activists (Raschke 1991, pp.80 - 113); but none of this is reflected in Scott. It seems 
that political reductionism allows us to throw sociological problems of method 
overboard, but does not require the acquisition of the research skills appropriate to 
political science or to history [7]. 
Rationality and the disappearance of the object 
This last example suggests something of what is wrong with this kind of 
reductionism. Not only does the apparent object of research - the phenomenological 
reality of social movements, the 'life-world' of West German Greens in 1990 - 
disappear from sight, but the issue of the relevance of the empirical material to this 
object is also ignored, so long as the material is relevant to the author's theoretical 
presuppositions. I take this to be another element of the idea of a 'problematic': that 
in effect the theory constitutes its own data. I am not convinced, however, that this 
is necessarily the case (Thompson 1977); rather, it is an effect of a particular 
approach to rationality. The world must be made to seem rational, in terms of the 
author's definition of rationality - there must, for example, be leaders - at any cost 
in terms of our attempts to understand (to explain rather than to explain away) that 
world [8]. 
In more formal terms, what is happening is, firstly, a confusion between 
methodology and ontology. Weber argued that social scientists construct 'ideal-
typical' descriptions of processes in rational terms, but that these are heuristic 
devices, against which actual events must be measured (Weber (1984, pp.20 - 22), 
Sadri (1992, pp.11 - 22)). Much of the literature effectively identifies ideal types 
with reality tout court. 
Secondly, there is a double short-circuiting of the concept of rationality which is 
used. On the one hand, no justification is given for a presupposition of instrumental 
rationality as the only available form of rational action, as opposed to, for example, 
value rationality (Weber 1984, pp.44 - 46) or communicative rationality 
(Habermas 1984, 1987) [9]. On the other hand, there is equally no justification for 
the assumption that the local contexts of rationality of social movement actors and 
social scientists coincide. Even instrumental rationality, in other words, cannot 
simply be abstracted from the lived contexts within which it may be used. Accounts 
in terms of 'substantive rationality' raise even more problems. 
No account of rationality which is not grounded in an examination of the actual 
experiences and ways of thinking of social movement actors can be entirely 
credible. This is not simply an abstract criticism: the effect of the presupposition of 
rationality, as defined or (more commonly) taken for granted by the theorist, is to 
reproduce the well-known problems which derive from taking a similar approach 
to 'old' social movements and in particular the workers' movement. One of the 
central problems in western Marxism (Jay 1984, Gottlieb 1989) over the past 
seventy years or so has been precisely to explain why actors have not behaved in the 
way that abstractly goal-rational accounts predicted. 
The social basis at the end of the rainbow 
I have argued, in effect, that the 'social movements' literature is based on the 
assumption of an abstract instrumental rationality which leads to a political 
reductionism. Within this framework, the different strands of the literature then 
converge in the attempt to discover a relationship of the appropriate kind between 
the socially given 'interests' of the groups which make up the movements and the 
action of the movements on the polity. The search for the 'social basis' of what is 
conceived of as political action, in other words, is a central one within the literature. 
In this next section, I will attempt to show that this search has been unsuccessful. 
More exactly, I will argue that an adequate resolution within the terms of the 
existing problematic has not been forthcoming, and that a resolution of the problem 
is in fact blocked off by these terms, in particular the political reductionism of the 
literature and the assumption of goal-rationality; and this despite the central status 
of the issue within the overall problematic: for any instrumentalist account, the 
failure to adequately explain the social sources of action is not a marginal one. 
Universally present interests 
The simplest accounts 'focus on the conditions which facilitate or constrain the 
occurrence of conflicts, taking the existence of potential grievances for granted', as 
Diani (1992, p.5) says of resource mobilisation and political process theories. A 
variant on this is found in much movement literature: here it is simply assumed that 
the rightness of the cause in question is a sufficient explanation for mobilisation 
[10]. Both approaches thus assume a very simple kind of rational interest, 
potentially shared by all members of society, in realising the stated aims of 
movement organisations, and necessarily pass to a discussion of organisation and 
action. Theories which argue that the issues are issues of 'species survival' or as 
related to universally present 'risks' clearly also fall within this category. In effect, 
these accounts deal with necessary conditions for movement mobilisation, but blunt 
the analysis by assuming these conditions to be universally given. The important 
question is then the identification of sufficient conditions which might explain why 
some individuals become involved but others do not [11]. 
More complex versions of this approach also assume that the relevant interests are 
universally given, but treat the social articulation of these interests as a process in 
which both the interest and the (collective) actor are formed in particular ways. 
This approach includes variants of collective behaviour theory which examine the 
formation of 'emergent norms' within collective actors (Diani 1992, p. 4; see also 
Brand's 'process model' of social movements (1982, pp.35 - 37)). There is then in a 
sense an increase in rationality from submerged interests to organised demands. 
However, given that a weak or contradictory specification of demands is often taken 
to be characteristic of contemporary movements (Raschke 1985, pp.105 - 116, 
Melucci 1989, pp.25 - 30, Tovey 1993), and that these movements are frequently 
seen as less dominated by formal organisations or organisational élites than earlier 
social movements (Diani 1992, pp.7 - 8), any strong version of this approach 
effectively takes its premises for its conclusion in the way we have seen earlier [12]. 
Socially specific interests 
More substantive accounts take the social origin, and hence the social specificity, of 
interests as their starting point. The essential argument can be formulated as 
follows: Even if we granted that the interests represented by new movements or 
satisfied by participation had some value for everyone, this would still be 
outweighed for most people by other considerations and other interests. The 
important issue is then not the discovery of abstract, universal interests, but the 
analysis of the sufficient conditions under which such interests will become the 
foundation of action for specific individuals or groups. Simple structural 
determinisms assume a direct relationship between individual or group interest and 
movement formation. Constructivist accounts place the emphasis more on the self-
formation of a collective actor from socially specific bases. 
Straightforward structural determinisms 
One kind of structural determinism is an analysis of contemporary movements as 
representing a 'petit bourgeois' ideology. Klaus Eder's (1985) account effectively falls 
into this category [13]. Thus we are offered sweeping, and ultimately a priori 
statements of the kind 'The petite bourgeoisie are predestined by their social 
situation to be protesting moralists' (1985, p.888). This account conflates small 
property-owners, managers and the public-sector 'new middle class' into a single 
category which appears ultimately to be defined by being neither bourgeois nor 
proletarian; it produces both a very peculiar account of new social movement issues, 
within which (for example) the peace movement and the women's movement are 
seen as 'collective moral protest[s]' which 'follow[] the logic of the ritual reversal of 
official reality' (Eder 1985, p.879). The difficulty here, since the new middle class 
has been collapsed back into the old middle class, is to explain the historical 
specificities of the movements; this is resolved in effect by denying that there are 
any. This approach also fails to offer any theorisation of the actual relations of 
production and reproduction experienced by the 'new petite bourgeoisie' which 
might explain the admitted differences from the old petite bourgeoisie in terms of 
social movement activity (Eder 1985, pp.877 - 878) [14]. 
Other accounts do just this and offer a reason for the differential participation of the 
'old petite bourgeoisie' and the 'new' in terms of 'new class' analyses. Trivial versions 
of this argue that the interests of this class, specified as 'unemployed academics', 
involve forcing the state to create jobs for them (Bürklin 1987); it is then unclear 
why this should generate peace and ecology movements rather than movements in 
support of an extension of the welfare state. More credible accounts focus on 
different aspects of well-known changes in social structure, identifying this new 
class as a 'service class' (Lash and Urry 1987), as related to an increasingly 
differentiated cultural sphere (Alber 1989), or other variants on definition by 
occupational position or macrosocial 'function'. 
A sophisticated version of this approach is found in Buttel, who sees an increasing 
differentiation of 'subordinate class groupings' in 'post-Fordist' society, leading to 
their inability to unite (1993, p.18). This account (and others which treat social or 
ideological heterogeneity as problematic), however, assumes an overly homogenous 
working class in 'Fordist' society: the creation of the working class as an effective 
social actor has always involved the negotiation of differences, the exertion of 
hegemony, the playing-down of gender, ethnic and religious divides, and so on 
(Thompson 1968, Gramsci 1971). This points to a more general difficulty in these 
accounts: while the role of 'historically-contingent factors' (Buttel 1993, p.17) or of 
class-for-itself (Lash and Urry 1987) is nominally recognised, in practice what is 
given with the left hand is taken away with the right, and we are left with an 
account of social-structural givens translating mechanically into predictable forms 
of action. [15] This means that accounts of the 'service class' such as Lash and Urry's 
have no real way to explain differential participation within the class: not only are 
managers or planners fairly unlikely to participate in social movements, they are 
likely to be their immediate opponents. 
A third version of this approach, best represented by Inglehart (1990), identifies 
structural givens on a non-class basis (effectively identified with economic security 
and changes in child-rearing practices): since these new conditions are related to 
income and culture, this tends to become a stratification equivalent to the 'new class' 
approach (although here it is assumed that everyone can ultimately become 'post-
materialist'), and is vulnerable to the same criticisms. Simple structural 
determinisms, in other words, ought to be able to account for patterned differences 
in participation, but they can only do so partially [16]. 
Constructivist accounts 
There is thus a move from simple structural determinisms to accounts which leave 
more space for the self-formation of movements and which can therefore afford a 
looser specification of social bases. Following by now traditional 'new left' critiques 
of determinist Marxism, these stress the creation of social movements as an active 
process, emphasise the need to deal with cultural questions of class consciousness, 
ideological hegemony and class culture, and query overly simplistic notions of social 
class as universally determining and equivalent to occupational position. What is 
put in place of these explanations is then a different matter. 
The most thorough-going Weberian constructivism is that offered by Hradil (1987), 
who describes a multiplicity of 'life situations' based on the domination of 
individuals' experience by their positive or negative position on different axes of 
inequality (of income, power, risk, etc.), and the formation of different 'lifestyles' 
corresponding more or less closely to these first groups. This enables the 
identification of an 'alternative-left' milieu whose goals of 'integration, participation 
and self-realisation' can be related to participation in new social movements. 
A more marxisant version of this approach, based on the same data, can be found in 
Hermann (1990), who follows Bourdieu in seeing only two central axes - economic 
and cultural capital - but identifies a rather looser relation between the groups 
identified in relation to these axes and the habitus associated with 'new social 
milieus'. This approach can generate something very close to empirically available 
descriptions of, for example, the Green vote in Germany (Kleining and Krotz 1986). 
However, it is again not an explanatory model: this is explicit in Hradil and implicit 
in Hermann, who refers explanation to Bourdieu's more general model. In 
particular, the link between social-structural location and milieu formation is not 
elucidated. 
Lastly, a number of writers (Giddens (1987, 1990), Bagguley (1992), but see also 
Offe (1985) and Wilde (1990)) attempt to resolve a similar difficulty by offering 
such a link in the form of what is effectively substantive rationality. In other words, 
rather than proceeding 'upwards' from the social basis, the basis is specified 
'downwards', in terms of the structural features it challenges.  
For Giddens, social movements are related to the institutional dimensions of 
modernity; the relationship is not ultimately specified more closely than the 
statement that the created environment deriving from industrialism, for example, 
forms the 'site of struggle' for the ecological movement. The peace movement is 
similarly related to the industrialisation of war, free speech and democratic 
movements to the development of 'surveillance', and the labour movement to the 
development of capitalism (Giddens (1990, pp.158 - 161); cf. Giddens (1987, 
pp.22 - 28)). This is not in itself an explanation, however [17].  
The implicit suggestion is a purely rational one: that movements are substantively 
rational responses to particular problems. This is then apparently divorced from any 
notion of a social basis to movement challenges: movements are not simply formed, 
for example, by those who are disadvantaged by particular institutional 
developments, but rather 'realizing the goals [of emancipatory politics] often 
depends upon the realization of the agencies of the privileged' (Giddens 1990, 
p.162). Quite why the 'agencies of the privileged' should challenge the very 
institutions that their privilege is based on is not made clear, and we are left with a 
sort of Whiggery run riot, in which all actors, including not just social movements 
but also public opinion, government and corporation policy-makers, and 
'international organisations' (Giddens 1990, pp.161 - 162), are seen as 
contributing, each in their own small way, towards substantive rationality on a 
global scale. Giddens' approach, in other words, tends, to the extent that it is 
coherent, to 'disappear' both movements and their social bases, leaving only general 
accounts of the difficulties of steering contemporary societies. 
Bagguley (1992) perhaps goes furthest in his rejection of determinist analyses of 
contemporary movements, observing correctly that these accounts fail to show how 
the links they postulate between interests and movements in fact operate. Such 
accounts close off, he argues, 'the possibility of a structural approach to [new social 
movements] which delivers a causal analysis specifying the social relations outside 
of class relations in which [new social movements] may be grounded'. These 
relations are then identified as 'those social relations which [new social movements] 
seek to transform in some way' (1992, p.37). The approach is then similar to 
Giddens', but more coherent and more plausible insofar as agency is identified 
explicitly with struggles within these relations. Bagguley also offers a rethinking of 
the 'social basis' issue by identifying the 'new middle class', which figures so 
prominently in many accounts of contemporary movements, with Gramsci's 
'traditional intellectuals', so that their participation does not of itself say anything 
about the class basis of the movements in question, which are essentially explained 
as substantively rational responses to structural problems. Lawrence Wilde's (1990) 
distinction between 'class for itself' and 'class for itself and for all', and Claus Offe's 
argument that new social movements represent the 'politics of a class, but not on 
behalf of a class' (1985, p.838) follow a similar strategy of identifying rationality, 
not at the level of the actor, but at a societal level or as substantive rationality. This is 
essentially a delaying tactic, however: if the problems are real and the movement 
challenge is rational, why is the challenge not universal? At this point, of course, we 
are back at the start [18]. 
A dead end 
In other words, constructivist accounts tend to rely on societal or substantive 
rationality, but cannot account for the specifics of its social incarnation. Determinist 
accounts simply fail to offer a theoretically and empirically adequate account of the 
'social basis'. In both cases, in the conflict between offering an adequate account of 
the 'social basis' and the authors' construction of rationality, the second always wins 
out; the phenomenology of contemporary movements is bracketed in favour of 
discussions of class structure, modernity, and so on - or, more exactly, it is deduced 
from them. This is a critical failure for the 'new social movements' literature, which 
sets out precisely to demonstrate that movement activity can be explained in 
instrumentalist terms. 
Trying to break out: Alberto Melucci 
Alberto Melucci's (1989) account of the meaning of social movements is 
simultaneously one of the most serious responses to the 'social movement' 
problematic and a vivid demonstration of the need to transcend it. He argues that 
much of the contemporary literature is characterised by an a priori political 
reductionism which focuses only on the impact of the new movements on the 
political system, describing this as representing a 'myopia of the visible' which 
'ignores the way in which the visible action of contemporary movements depends 
upon their production of new cultural codes within submerged networks' (1989, 
p.44) [19]. 
Melucci's analysis starts from the argument that the root of contemporary 
movement formation is a system-immanent contradiction deriving from the growth 
of macro-social reflexivity which counterposes a systemic logic of integration and 
control to the distribution of the information resources employed to operate this 
system, which then form a 'potential for individualisation' (1989, p.48). New 
middle-class and 'affluent marginal' groups are then seen as central to these 
contradictions, where their growing potential for the individual control of action is 
countered by the expropriation of this reflexivity and self-production: in other 
words, this approach examines both problem and response, or substantive and local 
rationality.  
Melucci's analysis of movement formation sees collective action, proceeding initially 
from these groups, as ultimately creating its own bases: 'In complex societies 
collective action creates new spaces which function as a genuine sub-system. These 
social spaces are the products of different forms of behaviour which the system is 
unable to integrate, and include not only conflictual action but also deviant 
behaviour and cultural experimentation' (1989, p.56). There then seems to be a 
developmental aspect to this: 
'In the 1980s, collective action came to be based on 'movement areas'. These take the 
form of networks composed of a multiplicity of groups that are dispersed, 
fragmented and submerged in everyday life, and which act as cultural laboratories. 
They require individual investments in the experimentation and practice of new 
cultural models, forms of relationships and alternative perceptions and meanings of 
the world. The various groups comprising these networks mobilize only periodically 
in response to specific issues. [My emphasis.] The submerged networks function as a 
system of exchanges, in which individuals and information circulate. Memberships 
are multiple and involvement is limited and temporary; personal involvement is a 
condition for participation. The latent movement areas create new cultural codes 
and enable individuals to put them into practice.' (Melucci 1989, p.60) 
This development is seen as leading towards 'soft' and multiple organisations and a 
distinction between 'intense but temporary mobilisations and movement networks 
that produce information, self-reflection and symbolic resources'. These networks 
are absolutely fundamental for the movements: 'collective action is nourished by the 
daily production of alternative frameworks of meaning' (1989, p.70); and 'the 
potential for resistance ... is located in the molecular experience of the individuals or 
groups who practice the alternative meanings of everyday life.' (1989, p.71). 
At this point it would surely seem natural to move from a focus on movements to a 
focus on these 'movement areas' or 'networks' (a shift which also seems to be 
indicated by accounts such as those of the Hannover group (Clemens 1990, Geiling 
1990, Vester et al. 1993)). The networks are seen as (1) more continuous and stable 
than the movements; (2) forming the ultimate source of movement mobilisation; 
and (3) operating in everyday life. If we add the argument, made in Raschke (1985, 
pp.74-5) and elsewhere, that the 'new social movements' are to be seen as forming a 
single, albeit heterogenous, whole, then a reversal of the terms, in which the focus is 
on these 'movement areas' of which movements are a temporary outgrowth, seems 
to be called for. This is particularly true since Melucci pulls away from the 
traditional political reductionism to argue that collective conflicts are becoming 
increasingly personal, in the sense of a tension between public declaration of aims 
and direct innovatory practice in daily life, and that conflicts are increasingly about 
meanings. Thus, Melucci argues, collective action is 'pre-political' (rooted in 
everyday life experience) and 'meta-political' (incapable of being fully represented 
by political forces) (Melucci 1989, p.72). 
However, this distancing from goal-rational assumptions is not sustained. The 
option of shifting to an analysis of networks is apparently recognised, but rejected in 
a curious footnote which appears to be based on Melucci's assumption that 
representation prevents fragmentation: he argues that 'collective actors are prone to 
disperse, fragmented and atomized, into networks which quickly disappear into 
sects, emotional support circles and therapy groups' (1989, pp.71-2) [20]. This 
'disappearance' of collective action would, however, surely be a matter for empirical 
investigation rather than a prioridismissal. What Melucci is saying seems to be 
rather that the networks 'disappear' from relevance because they no longer have a 
political output: we note that what is covered by the rather odd formula of 'sects, 
emotional support circles and therapy groups' is treated as a non-existence into 
which networks 'disappear'. They clearly do not disappear in phenomenological 
terms; the disappearance seems to be a political one. In other words, Melucci 
identifies the (immediate) social basis of contemporary movements correctly, notes 
its logically prior status to the movements themselves, but cannot accept that it has 
an independent existence.  
This, I think, can only be explained in terms of a definition of relevance for which 
only (directly or indirectly) political events are real. The possibility of a cultural 
challenge is not considered: this despite the statement that movements include 
'symbolic challenges' which lead to 'a molecular change which is cultural in the 
anthropological sense: an alteration of daily life, of ways of living and forms of 
social and personal relationships' (1989, p.75) [21]. Within the 'social movements' 
problematic as currently constructed, in other words, even the most 'culturalist' 
authors and the most challenging conceptions of the social origins of new 
movements are ultimately retained within an assumption of what we might call the 
'last instance' priority of instrumental political rationality. 
Beyond the 'social movements' problematic 
What are the implications of this critique for research in this area? One obvious 
response is that attention needs to be shifted from 'social movements' and 'social 
bases' to those social formations which not only mediate between these two, but 
which are on the one hand more continuous and more firmly rooted in everyday life 
than social movements and on the other hand more directly connected to conflictual 
meanings and practices than a purely objectivist account of class as structural 
position allows for: in other words, what Melucci describes as 'networks' or 
'movement areas'. These need to be examined in their own terms, as a prerequisite 
for any effective discussion of movements. This would mean a move away from a 
reductionism which is interested only in those networks whose impact is visibly 
political, and only in the political aspects of those networks: both cultural 
contestation and defensive strategies of withdrawal, a response to 'contestation' from 
above, are possible. This would then enable a more grounded account of social 
movements, which could bridge the gap between accounts of 'new social 
movements' and accounts of the labour movement which offer less reductionist 
accounts of class culture and organisation (Wilde 1990, Thompson 1968); it might 
also go some way towards bridging the gap towards some cultural studies 
perspectives (McRobbie 1994). 
It would also make it possible to escape the definition of apparently isolated 
'movements' in terms of 'issues'. In the 'social movements' literature this has been a 
natural effect of goal-rational accounts, but it is undercut by the recurring 
assumption in most, if not all, authors, that the social basis of the different 'new 
social movements' is substantially the same. If the immediate 'social basis' consists of 
groups who 'mobilize only periodically in response to specific issues' (Melucci 1989, 
p.60), it becomes plausible to argue that the isolation of individual movements is 
more an effect of (activist or academic) rhetoric than it is a real feature of their 
operation; and I would certainly argue that in practice mobilisation 'in response to 
specific issues' tends to upset definitions of 'movements' which are based on overly 
reductionist concepts of 'the issues'. 
Lastly, if the critique of the presupposition of instrumental rationality makes it 
possible to reconceptualise movement contexts, it also transforms the nature of the 
modes of rationality operative in these contexts into an open question for research, 
rather than an a priori theoretical issue. In other words, the meanings and practices 
created within these contexts become of interest in their own right. 
I think it makes sense to argue, as a number of authors have done, that we cannot 
think in terms of a single, transcendentally justified but universally present mode of 
rationality. Authors such as Habermas (1984, 1987) and Offe (1985) argue for a 
distinction between logics of instrumental rationality and logics of communicative 
rationality, within which social movements are located or which they aim to defend 
or expand. Other authors, such as Melucci (1989) or Sulkunen (1992), argue for 
the presence of radicalised forms of reflexivity in these or related contexts, which 
undercut instrumental rationality by turning forms of organisation, for example, 
into an end in themselves rather than simply a means to an end. This should not be 
taken as an alternative a priori position, but as a starting point for research into the 
actual local modes of rationality of these contexts.  
We may then find, for example, that the interaction between new ways of life and 
forms of subjectivity on the one hand, and new socio-political forces on the other - 
in present-day Ireland, for example, the interaction between "holistic healing", new 
spirituality, alternative lifestyles etc. and ecological and feminist activism on the 
other -, appears less as an illegitimate or irrelevant case of correlation or confusion 
of essentially distinct categories than as a natural intermingling of what weclassify 
as 'political' or 'cultural' activity on the part of networks which are articulated 
around both, and where both flow naturally from the local modes of rationality 
which operate within the everyday world of these networks. In this spirit, it is 
possible that the concepts of 'skills' and 'knowledge' - or, in more Gramscian terms, 
'directive' and 'theoretical' intellectual activity - could bridge the gap between an 
ideal-typical account of modes of rationality and an effective analysis of actual 
practices and meanings [22]. 
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Footnotes 
1 The distinction between those authors who make use of the phrase 'new social 
movements' and those who prefer a different language is an increasingly artificial 
one, and is not employed here. 
2 While Diani's attempt at a definition of the 'social movement' concept goes some 
distance in the direction that I am arguing for, it assumes a correspondence between 
the definition of the concept and its usage which is absent in practice. 
3 Cohen notes that Touraine excludes 'strategic rationality' from his concept of 
social movements. However, Touraine's insistence that "social movements" are only 
those which represent a challenge to the control of "historicity" (societal self-
production and reproduction) effectively replaces one political focus with another 
one (Touraine 1981, p.77). 
4 In this curious procedure, the earlier concession that 'culturalist theories do have 
a partial explanation of social movements['] effects in terms of cultural innovation' 
(Scott 1990, p.134) seems to have sunk without trace. 
5 See e.g. Jurtschitsch et al. (1988) for a snapshot of party debate in this period. (I 
spent the academic year 1990-91 as a participant observer within the Hamburg-
Altona Greens and other 'alternative' contexts. ) 
6 Joachim Raschke's (1991) study of the party, by contrast with Scott's book, not 
only makes the attempt to discover the actual interrelations of ideas and political 
organisation, but also has the merit of being based on a considerable amount of 
empirical research.  
7 An equally sloppy approach is taken by Giddens (1987, p.31), who discusses the 
'ecology movement' on the basis of an examination of the manifestoes of the 
European Green Parties, equally without considering the extent to which they 
represent the actual 'ideology' of the parties concerned, let alone the movement.  
8 Alternatively we might say that an account of social movements is being 
constructed which corresponds, not even to those of their features which are 
directly available to research (see Wainwright (1994, pp.100 - 106) for a relevant 
discussion of 'critical realism' in this context), but to those aspects of movements 
which are readily available in the library. This is of course not true of authors such 
as Melucci or Touraine, who are attempting (unsuccessfully, as I shall argue below) 
to escape from this whole approach. 
9 Claus Offe's (1985, p.852) argument on the lesser applicability of "the economic 
logic of efficiency" in social contexts marked by 'decommodification' has some 
parallels with Berger, Berger and Kellner's (1974) argument that "demodernising 
consciousness" is blocked by direct interaction with the socially central processes of 
economic and political reproduction. 
10 While authors such as Offe and Bagguley also argue that movements are 
responding to real structural problems, they proceed to make the case that the social 
basis of the movements can be identified, in terms of the differential impact of these 
problems (Offe 1985, pp.842 - 848, 850 - 853; Bagguley 1992, pp.40 - 44). 
11 Here, as in other accounts oriented towards economistic discussions based on the 
assumption of purely instrumental action by individual actors, the 'free rider' 
problem becomes a paradox. This argues that it makes more sense for any given 
individual to sit back and let others act for them. In social movement contexts, of 
course, this is a paradox, since the issue is precisely the explanation of collective 
action (Cohen 1985, pp.676 - 677). 
12 Weak versions simply present general claims as to supposedly inherent logics of 
organisation, but once again fail to specify sufficient conditions for the mobilisation 
of particular social groups. 
13 Despite his critique of purely 'objective' or 'subjective' accounts of class, Eder's 
argument amounts to positing a single necessary relationship between class 
situation and class consciousness, and in practice appears as a very traditional 
determinism: 'The petit bourgeois consciousness corresponds with the objective 
position of that class' (1985, p.876), etc. Müller (1990) and Vester (1993) make 
significantly better use of the concept of habitus. 
14 For Eder (as in effect for Touraine) a social movement has to be 'rational', by 
which he clearly means 'substantively rational', since the remainder of the argument 
is replete with discussion of the 'logic' of the social-structural position of the petite 
bourgeoisie. Hence, what might appear to be social movements fail to qualify 
because they aren't sufficiently rational. 
15 This of course parallels Marx's argumentative strategy in the Communist 
Manifesto(Marx 1967, pp.89 - 91): on the one hand the distinction between class-
in-itself and class-for-itself is accepted, but on the other hand it is predicted that the 
one will necessarily turn into the other. 
16 One of the best descriptions of these differences is given by Raschke (1985, 
pp.416 - 417), who sees the social basis of the new movements as consisting of the 
'human services intelligentsia', overlapping with marginalised groups and with a 
broader 'resonance group' including in particular those affected by particular 
developments. Claus Offe (1985, pp.833 - 834, 850 - 853) attaches what seems to 
me to be an extremely ad hoc explanation to a similar description of the social basis. 
17 It is also worth noticing that Giddens is incapable of accounting for the women's 
movement in this context (Giddens 1990, pp.61 - 162). 
18 Offe does offer a potential way out of this by arguing that 'The broad 
constituency of movements as well as their pool of activists are drawn from those 
social groups which are most likely to be affected by the negative consequences of 
these processes and / or those who have the easiest cognitive access to the working 
of these processes and their consequences'. Unfortunately, his explanation for the 
observation that 'levels of education (and possibly the recency of educational 
experience as indicated by age) plays the most important role as a contribution of 
new movements' activism' hinges on the claims that 'educated people would not only 
be more competent to form their own judgment but also less bound by rigid reliance 
on the judgment of others' (Offe 1985, pp.848-851). Offe is explicitly concerned to 
argue that new movements represent a further stage in modernity and that their 
values are modernist rather than anti-modernist. 
19 Melucci is a strong proponent of what Cohen (1985) describes as the 'identity' 
paradigm within the social movements literature: he argues that identity, or the 
formulation of cognitive frameworks, the activation of relationships among actors, 
and the making of emotional investments, is a necessary feature of collective action 
and can thus never be entirely instrumental or negotiable. Movement action is also 
seen as partially cultural in operation: it 'transmits a message to the rest of society'; 
'its goals are temporary and to a certain extent replaceable' (1989, p.56). There is 
thus a radical rejection of traditional goal-rational accounts. However, as I shall 
argue, the bottom line for Melucci remains the political thrust of the movements. 
20 This may derive from one of Melucci's criteria for defining a 'social movement', 
as being something which 'breaks the limits of compatibility of a system' (Melucci 
1989, p.29; Melucci's emphasis). Claus Offe has a similar argument, but explicitly 
states its dependence on political criteria (Offe 1985, pp.826-7).  
21 It is worth noting that Raschke (1985:, pp.105 - 116) explicitly argues that 
orientations to power or to culture are equally possible for social movements.  
22 Hilary Wainwright's (1994) attempt to rethink the cognitive foundation for a 
new left makes some important steps in this direction.  
 
 
